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I. Introduction
Several court decisions applying Colorado law during the relevant time
period of this update materially impact the oil and gas industry.
In OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cty. Bd. of Commissioners,1 the Supreme
Court of Colorado considered whether an oil and gas company was entitled
to tax abatement due to an overvaluation of leasehold interest caused solely
by the company itself. Two cases, one a federal district court opinion
(Maralex Res., Inc. v. Jewell2) and the other a decision issued by the
Colorado Court of Appeals (Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm'n3) addressed the constitutionality of administrative
inspections of oil and gas wells by the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) and the Colorado Commission of Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (“COGCC”). The obligations of parties under an area-ofmutual interest agreement, and what actions constitute a breach of this
agreement, were considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC.4
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari in Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez.5
In 2018, 311 Senate bills and 475 House bills were introduced.6
Highlighted within this article are bills addressing oil and gas issues, two of
1. 2017 CO 104, 405 P.3d 1142 (Colo. 2017).
2. 301 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Colo. 2017).
3. 2018 COA 40 (March 22, 2018).
4. 887 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2018), (as revised Apr. 13, 2018).
5. 2018 WL 582105 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2018).
6. See All Bills, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018),
https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-search?field_subjects[0]=40&field_subjects[1]=38&field_

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss3/4

2018]

Colorado

313

which passed and eleven other bills that were introduced and debated but
postponed indefinitely.7 This update concludes by summarizing an
important 2018 COGCC rulemaking relating to flowlines and two ballot
initiatives materially affecting the oil and gas industry that will appear on
the 2018 statewide general election ballot.
II. Case Law
A. Overvaluation of Oil and Gas Leasehold Assessments
In OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, the court
considered whether an oil and gas company was entitled to abatement under
Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A) due to an overvaluation error
caused by the company itself.8 Oil and gas leaseholds are treated, and
taxed, as real property in Colorado.9 In order to ascertain the taxes due on
leasehold interests, operators are required by statute to provide information
about the amount of oil and gas sold and produced to the taxation authority
by filing annual statements; the assessor then uses those annual statements
to ascribe a value to leasehold interests for taxation.10
In this case, OXY USA, Inc. (“OXY”) filed its annual statement but later
“discovered that it had failed to deduct certain allowable costs” therefrom,
resulting in the over-reporting of the “selling price of its gas at the
wellhead,” and consequently, the overvaluation of its leasehold interests
and overpayment of taxes thereon.11 OXY filed an amended annual
statement and petitioned for abatement under the above mentioned statute,
but the Mesa County Board of Commissioners (“County Board”) denied
OXY’s petition, stating that abatement was not proper when the taxpayer
was the source of the error.12 The Board of Assessment Appeals reversed
the County Board, finding that OXY was entitled to abatement.13 The
County Board appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed with the

sessions=45771&field_chamber=All&field_bill_type=All&sort_bef_combine=search_api_r
elevance%20DESC. (last visited July 16, 2018).
7. 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018), https://leg.colorado.gov/billsearch?field_sessions=45771&sort_bef_combine=field_bill_number%20ASC (Search for
Subjects: Energy, Natural Resources & Environment).
8. 2017 CO 104, ¶ 1, 405 P.3d 1142, 1143 (Colo. 2017).
9. Id. at ¶ 4, 405 P.3d at 1144.
10. Id. at ¶ 5, 405 P.3d at 1144.
11. Id. at ¶ 6, 405 P.3d at 1144.
12. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8 405 P.3d at 1144.
13. Id. at ¶ 9, 405 P.3d at 1144.
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County Board; OXY then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for writ
of certiorari, which was granted.14
The precise issue upon which writ was granted was as follows: “whether
section 39-10-114(1)(a)(I)(A) permits abatement for an error caused solely
by the taxpayer,” the error being overvaluation.15 The court first considered
the plain language of the aforesaid statute, which “allows the abatement and
refund of property taxes erroneously or illegally levied ‘due to erroneous
valuation for assessment, irregularity in levying, clerical error, or
overvaluation.’”16 It found that the statute was significantly silent on the
source of such error, and that “[t]his silence suggests the source of the error
does not matter.”17 Next, it held that the court of appeals misplaced
reliance on certain precedent in reaching its decision. Specifically, the
court noted that Coquina Oil Corp. v. Larimer County Bd. of
Equalization,18 which pertained to erroneous overvaluation of leasehold
interests due to clerical error, was inapplicable because two years following
such decision, the legislature superseded the same by amending the statute
to expressly address overvaluation.19 The legislative history surrounding
this amendment also indicates an intent to provide broad relief in
circumstances of overvaluation.20 Additionally, the court found that while
Boulder County Bd. of Commissioners v. HealthSouth Corp.21 stated that
“assessor error may be the most likely cause of overvaluation,” it does
prevent the issuance of abatement in other circumstances, i.e., when
someone other than the assessor, such as the taxpayer, is the cause of the
overvaluation.22 Therefore, the court held that Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-10114(1)(a)(I)(A) “gives taxpayers the right to seek abatement and refund for
erroneously or illegally levied taxes resulting from overvaluation caused
14. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 405 P.3d at 1144.
15. Id. at ¶ 15, 405 P.3d at 1145.
16. Id. at ¶ 7, 405 P.3d at 1144.
17. Id. at ¶ 17, 405 P.3d at 1145.
18. 770 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 1989).
19. OXY USA Inc.,at ¶¶ 18-21, 405 P.3d at 1145-46.
20. Id. at ¶¶ 25-32, 405 P.3d at 1146-47. (According to the court, “[t]he legislative
declaration accompanying the 1991 amendment is particularly telling: The General
Assembly explained that it was enacting the bill ‘with the intent of clarifying’ that the court
of appeals’ statutory interpretation . . . was incorrect and that any taxpayer has ‘the right to
petition for an abatement or refund of property taxes levied erroneously or illegally due to an
overvaluation of such taxpayer’s property.’”) Id. at ¶ 30 (quoting Ch. 309, sec. 1, 1991
Colo. Sess. Laws 1962, 1962)).
21. 246 P.3d 948 (Colo. 2011).
22. OXY USA Inc., at ¶ 35, 405 P.3d at 1147.
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solely by taxpayer mistake,” and reversed the court of appeals’ decision,
finding that OXY was entitled to the abatement sought.23
B. Search and Seizure Challenges to Administrative Well Inspections
1. BLM Authority – Federal and Indian Lands
The court considered the scope of the BLM’s authority to inspect wells
on fee property when subject to a communitization agreement in Maralex
Res., Inc. v. Jewell.24 In that case, minerals owned by Mr. O’Hare
(“O’Hare”) were leased to Maralex Resources, Inc. (“Maralex”); Maralex
then contributed the O’Hare lease to a Communization Agreement (“CA”)
with minerals owned by the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (“Tribe”).25 The
BLM contacted Maralex to provide notice of their intention to inspect
certain wells within the CA, including a well located on the O’Hare
property.26 O’Hare refused to let the BLM inspector on his property, and
consequently, Maralex was issued four Notices of Incidents of
Noncompliance (“NICs”); the BLM also mandated as corrective action that
Maralex provide the BLM with keys to the property gates or alternatively
allow the BLM to place its own locks on the property gates to facilitate
access.27 Eventually O’Hare allowed the BLM to inspect the well and
Maralex appealed the NICs to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(“IBLAs”), which upheld them.28
The court here considered whether the IBLA’s decision to uphold the
NICs was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”29 The IBLA’s authority in the instant case comes
from the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (“FOGRMA”),
which governs royalty payments from oil and gas leases on Federal and
Indian lands.30 FOGRMA also authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to
conduct ‘any investigation or other inquiry necessary and appropriate’ to
carry out his or her duties under FOGRMA.”31 With respect to inspections,
FOGRMA provides, in relevant part, as follows:

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at ¶ 36, 405 P.3d at 1148.
301 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Colo. 2017).
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 981.
See id. at 980.
Id.
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Authorized and properly identified representatives of the
Secretary may without advance notice, enter upon, travel across
and inspect lease sites on Federal or Indian lands and may obtain
from the operator immediate access to secured facilities on such
lease sites, for the purpose of making any inspection or
investigation for determining whether there is compliance with
the requirements of the mineral leasing laws and this chapter. . . .
For the purpose of making any inspection or investigation under
this chapter, the Secretary shall have the same right to enter upon
or travel across any lease site as the lessee or operator has
acquired by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.”32
On appeal, Maralex argued that the BLM had no right “to conduct
warrantless, unannounced inspections of oil and gas facilities located on fee
lands,” and even if they were so authorized, FOGRMA does not support the
directive for landowners “to provide the BLM with keys to the landowner’s
locked gates or allow the BLM to place its own locks on the landowner’s
locked gates.” 33 Additionally, Maralex contended that such BLM searches
violate Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure.34 The IBLA determined, and the court affirmed, that although
FOGRMA “refers only to ‘lease sites on Federal or Indian lands,’
production from any lease site subject to a communitization agreement
(whether on fee or Indian land) is deemed to occur on each lease site within
the communitization agreement”.35 Therefore, because a portion of the
revenue generated from production of the well on the O’Hare property was
allocated to the Tribe, the BLM had the authority to inspect wells on fee
lands subject to a CA.36
The court also found that such BLM searches did not violate the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.37
O’Hare leased his minerals to Maralex, and thus, consented to allowing
Maralex to enter the property.38 Maralex then contributed the O’Hare lease
32. Id. at 980, (citing 30 U.S.C. §1718(b), (c)).
33. Id. at 981.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 982-83.
36. Id at 983 (“FOGRMA requires the development of procedures to ensure proper
collection and disbursement of oil and gas revenues owed to Indian lessors from oil and gas
both originating from, and allocated to, Indian Lands.”) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 984-85
38. Id. at 984.
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to a CA and “agreed to the BLM’s supervision over all operations subject to
the agreement”; consequently, the BLM acquired the same right to enter
O’Hare’s lands as Maralex.39 Further, so long as the inspections performed
by the BLM do not exceed the scope of the CA or the applicable statutes
and regulations, “providing the BLM with keys to the O’Hares’ locked
gates, or placing the BLM’s own locks on O’Hares’ gates, does not violate
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.”40
2. COGCC Authority – Fee Lands
A similar search and seizure argument, also including O’Hare, was
decided in Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm'n.41 Maralex operated three wells on O’Hare’s surface.42 A field
inspector for the COGCC contacted Maralex requesting access to the wells
to perform an inspection.43 O’Hare was out of town so the inspector agreed
to delay inspection until the following day provided that Maralex contact
him “oil-field early,” an oil field custom and practice reference to 6:00
a.m.44 When the inspector had not heard from Maralex by 9:30 a.m., he
issued a notice of alleged violation for failure to provide access to the
wells.45 Later that day, O’Hare spoke with the inspector and sent a followup email in which he agreed to provide access to the wells for inspection
the following week; however, the correspondence also threatened the
inspector should he attempt to otherwise enter his property.46 The COGCC
obtained an administrative search warrant to inspect the wells and executed
the same, during which the inspector noted several violations.47 A followup inspection was conducted and the violations were found to be ongoing,
so the COGCC issued Maralex multiple notices of alleged violation.48
Maralex requested an administrative hearing to challenge these notices, at
which the notices were upheld and the COGCC issued an order finding
violation (“OFV”).49 O’Hare and Maralex appealed the COGCC’s OFV to

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
2018 COA 40, 2018 WL 1417462 (Colo. App. March 22, 2018).
Id. at ¶ 4, 2018 WL 1417462 at *1.
Id. at ¶ 7, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 8, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2.
Id. at ¶ 9, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2.
Id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 2018 WL 1417462 at *2.
Id. at ¶ 12-13, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3.
Id. at ¶ 13, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3.
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the district court, which affirmed the COGCC’s order; Maralex and O’Hare
appealed again.50
The main contention on appeal, which was a matter of first impression
for the court, was whether the “COGCC rule permitting random,
warrantless searches of oil and gas properties violates the United States and
Colorado Constitutions.”51 The court characterized this claim as “a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 204, which permits authorized
COGCC staff ‘the right at all reasonable times to go upon and inspect any
oil or gas properties.’”52 The court disagreed with the petitioner’s
arguments and concluded that Rule 204 falls under the administrative
search exception, known as the Colonnade-Biswell exception, to the
warrant requirement.53 Said exception provides that:
“[A] warrantless inspection made pursuant to a regulatory
scheme of a closely regulated industry is reasonable if three
requirements are met.” First, the regulatory scheme must “be
informed by a substantial government interest.” Second,
warrantless searches must be necessary to further that
government interest. Third, the regulatory scheme must “provide
a ‘constitutionally adequate substitute’ for a warrant in terms of
the certainty and regularity of the program’s application.”54
The rationale behind this exception is that an owner of premises subject to a
pervasively regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, and
therefore, “the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements have
lessened application.”55
In reaching its conclusion, the court considered each of the above
requirements in turn. First, the court found that the oil and gas industry is
closely regulated because the “COGCC is empowered to ‘do whatever may
reasonably be necessary to carry out the provisions of’” the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act (“Act”) and “has promulgated comprehensive rules
regulating multitudinous aspects of the oil and gas industry.”56 The court
50. Id. at ¶ 1, 2018 WL 1417462 at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at ¶ 16, 2018 WL 1417462 at *3.
53. See id. at ¶ 24, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4.
54. Id. at ¶ 20, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4 (quoting New York v. Burger, 682 U.S. 691,
700 (1987)).
55. Id. at ¶ 21, 2018 WL 1417462 at *4 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978)).
56. Id. at ¶ 26, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5.
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determined that, based upon the Act’s directive that “it is ‘in the public
interest’ to ‘[f]oster the responsible, balanced development, production, and
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado in
a manner consistent with protection of public health, safety, and welfare,
including protection of the environment and wildlife resources,’”57 together
with the COGCC’s robust regulatory scheme, the state has a substantial
interest in regulating the oil and gas industry.58 Next, the court explained
that warrantless searches are necessary to effectuate the state’s interest
because “[r]equiring that inspectors apply to a court for a warrant before
each inspection would dramatically reduce COGCC’s enforcement power,
and might allow operators to conceal violations.”59 Finally, the court found
that the COGCC’s inspections were frequent enough that landowners had
an expectation that their property would be periodically inspected and that
the COGCC was subject to a reasonableness requirement that restricts their
authority to conduct random inspections; thus, a “constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant” is provided for in the COGCC’s regulatory
regime.60 Note that while the above analysis was performed with respect to
the Fourth Amendment under the United States Constitution, the court
stated that the result was the same under the Colorado Constitution.61
Several other issues were raised on appeal. O’Hare argued that Rule 204
was “unconstitutional as applied to surface owners” who did not own the
minerals.62 The court disagreed in this case as O’Hare had signed a surface
use agreement with Maralex granting “an extraordinarily broad set of
rights”;63 the court also opined that “in other cases where a surface owner
has granted a mineral lessee a broad surface easement, warrantless entry of
the surface estate would not necessarily violate the surface owner’s
rights.”64 Maralex also challenged the COGCC’s order as violating several
COGCC rules. Of import, the court agreed that the COGCC was arbitrary
and capricious in its determination that Maralex had failed to provide
access to wells on the O’Hare’s property “at ‘all reasonable times’.”65
Specifically, the court noted that the inspector had agreed to delay the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at ¶ 25-30, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 30, 2018 WL 1417462 at *5.
Id. at ¶¶ 32-33, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6.
Id. at ¶ 35, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6.
Id. at ¶ 38, 2018 WL 1417462 at *6.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 39, 2018 WL 1417462 at *7.
Id. at ¶ 45, 2018 WL 1417462 at *7.
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inspection to the following day until O’Hare was back in town, and the
mere fact that the inspector did not hear back until the afternoon of the
following day, as opposed to “oil-field early,” was not substantial evidence
to support COGCC’s determination.66 The court rejected all other
arguments by Maralex.
C. Breach of Contract Under Area of Mutual Interest Agreement
In Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC,67
the court considered several questions on appeal68 pertaining to various
contracts entered among oil and gas companies, including an area of mutual
interest agreement (“AMI Agreement”). The AMI Agreement, by and
among Spring Creek Exploration & Production Company, LLC (“Spring
Creek”), Gold Coast Energy, LLC (“Gold Coast”) and Hess Bakken
Investments II, LLC (“Hess’), was valid for a term of three years, and
provided, in relevant part:
During the term of the AMI, only [Hess] may proceed to lease or
otherwise acquire interests within the AMI. If, during the term
of the AMI, [Hess] should acquire any oil and gas lease,
leasehold interest or mineral interest, [Hess] should . . . offer
such interest to Coachman69 in the following proportions, [Hess]
(90%), Coachman (10%), pursuant to that certain Participation
Agreement dated October 8, 2009, by and between [Hess] and
Coachman.70
The AMI Agreement further provided that Spring Creek and Gold Coast
would receive an overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) on new leases
acquired by Hess during the AMI term.71
The AMI Agreement was executed in conjunction with the “Tomahawk
Agreement,” covering a small portion of lands within a larger area known
to Hess as the Rough Rider Prospect, subject to a separate agreement
(“Rough Rider Agreement”) one of its affiliates had entered in to with
Statoil Oil & Gas LP (“Statoil”). The Rough Rider Agreement prohibited
66. See id.
67. 887 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2018).
68. The only issues discussed herein are those decided by applying Colorado law; the
Tenth Circuit also applied North Dakota law to other issues and claims on appeals.
69. Id. at 1010. (Coachman Energy was a predecessor of Spring Creek and Gold
Coast.).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Hess from acquiring new leases in the Rough Rider Prospect for a period of
one year.72 Hess entered into the Tomahawk Agreement with Spring Creek,
Gold Coast and Coachman Energy during the one year non-compete
period.73 Statoil brought suit against Hess, and Statoil and Hess ultimately
reached a settlement agreement (“Settlement”) wherein Hess sold most of
its Tomahawk leases to Statoil at a discount and Hess agreed that any
additional leases acquired would be offered to Statoil at cost.74 The AMI
Agreement was not assigned from Hess to Statoil.75
Neither Spring Creek nor Gold Coast were privy to the settlement
negotiations or the Settlement itself. Hess did not acquire any new leases
during the remainder of the AMI term but resumed lease acquisitions at its
expiration.76 Statoil, on the other hand, acquired numerous leasehold
interests during the term of the AMI.77
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit court considered whether Hess
breached the AMI Agreement by failing to acquire any new leases during
its term. The court found that “[t]he AMI Agreement plainly does not
require Hess to acquire new leases,” but rather provides that if Hess should
acquire new leases, then Spring Creek and Gold Hill would be entitled to an
ORRI thereon.78 The court also found that there was no breach of an
implied covenant to acquire new leases given that Hess had no duty to
obtain new leases at all.79
Additionally, when considering whether Hess’ actions constituted
fraudulent concealment, the court agreed this tort claim was barred by the
economic loss rule.80 Spring Creek relied on a 1990 decision of the
Colorado Court of Appeals that had affirmed an award of money damages
for fraudulent concealment, H&H Distribs., Inc. v. BBC Int’l, Inc.,81 but this
opinion, which had been issued before the Colorado Supreme Court

72. Id. at 1009.
73. Id. at 1009-10.
74. Id. at 1010-11.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1011. (New leasing actually resumed three months after the Settlement was
reached, referred to therein as the “three-month tail” period). Id. at 1010-11.
77. See Id.
78. See Id. at 1018.
79. Id. at 1019-20.
80. Id. at 1021-23.
81. Id. at 1021 (H&H Distribs., Inc. v. BBC Int’l, Inc., 812 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1990);
internal citations omitted).
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adopted the economic loss rule, was deemed by the court to likely no longer
be good precedent. 82
D. Law Firm’s Responsibility in Negotiation for Undisclosed Principal
In Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP,83 Rocky
Mountain Exploration, Inc. (“RMEI”) brought suit against the law firm of
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLC (“DGS”), for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy. The claims arose from DGS’s
representation of Tracker Resource Exploration NC, LLC (“Tracker”), as
principal of Lario Oil and Gas Company (“Lario”), agent and purchaser of
certain assets from RMEI. RMEI and Tracker entered into agreements with
one another covering certain oil and gas leaseholds in North Dakota,
wherein RMEI agreed to sell eighty percent of its interest to Tracker.84 In
connection therewith, RMEI and Tracker entered into an area-of-mutual
interest agreement, an operating agreement, and a participation agreement.85
The operating agreement expressly disclaimed any joint venture or
fiduciary relationship between RMEI and Tracker and stated that it,
together with the participation agreement, constituted the entire agreement
between the parties, superseding all prior agreements.86
The relationship between Tracker and RMEI eventually deteriorated and
Tracker unsuccessfully attempted to purchase RMEI’s 20% interest.87
Lario then offered to purchase RMEI’s interest, striking a separate
agreement with Tracker that it would assign 75% of its acquired interest to
Tracker; the parties further agreed that they would not disclose Tracker’s
involvement in the transaction to RMEI.88 RMEI accepted Lario’s offer
and the parties entered into an agreement (“Letter Agreement”).89 DGS had
previously represented Tracker, and Lario sought to have DGS represent
them in the transaction; however, DGS determined there was a conflict of
interest.90 As such, DGS continued to represent only Tracker, preparing
many of the deal documents, though certain email correspondence
referenced DGS as Lario’s counsel.91 The transaction between RMEI and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1022.
2018 CO 54, 420 P.3d 223 (Colo. 2018).
Id. at ¶ 11, 420 P.3d. at 227.
Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 420 P.3d. at 227.
Id. at ¶ 12, 420 P.3d. at 227.
Id. at ¶ 13, 420 P.3d. at 227.
Id. at ¶ 15-17, 420 P.3d. at 227-28.
Id. at ¶ 17, 420 P.3d. at 228.
Id. at ¶ 16, 420 P.3d. at 228.
Id. at ¶¶ 16-19, 420 P.3d. at 228.
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Lario closed, and on the same date Lario transferred the contemplated
interest to Tracker, at which point RMEI learned of Tracker’s involvement
and filed suit against Tracker, Lario, certain of their officers, and DGS.92
Lario and Tracker eventually settled their claims, but RMEI brought
claims against DGS, alleging it “(1) engaged in a civil conspiracy to
misappropriate RMEI’s interests in the leaseholds at issue by setting up
Lario as a strawman purchaser; (2) aided and abetted Tracker’s breach of its
fiduciary duty to RMEI; (3) committed fraud; (4) engaged in a civil
conspiracy to commit fraud; and (5) aided and abetted fraud.”93 The
District Court granted DGS’s motion for summary judgment and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.94 RMEI appealed and the Colorado Supreme Court
granted certiorari.95
In considering the above questions, the court reiterated the distinction
between an undisclosed and an unidentified principal as set forth in the
Section 1.04(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Agency: “A principal is
undisclosed if the third party has no notice that the agent is acting for a
principal,” whereas “[a] principal is unidentified if the third party has notice
that the agent is acting for a principal but does not have notice of the
principal’s identity.”96 It is well known that “when an agent for an
undisclosed principal enters into a contract, the other party to that contract
may avoid the contract if (1) the agent falsely represents to the third party
that the agent does not act on behalf of a principal and (2) the principal or
agent had notice that the third party would not have dealt with the
principal”;97 however, “this rule does not apply to agents who act on behalf
of unidentified, as opposed to undisclosed, principals.”98
The court found that Tracker was an unidentified principal of Lario due
to disclosures contained in the agreements between Lario and RMEI.
Specifically, the Letter Agreement stated that Lario had venture partners in
the transaction,99 and further provided that “Lario has other investors or
92. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21, 420 P.3d. at 228.
93. Id. at ¶ 21, 420 P.3d. at 228.
94. Id. at ¶ 7, 420 P.3d. at 226.
95. Id.
96. Id. at ¶ 30, 420 P.3d. at 230 (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(2)).
97. Id. at ¶ 33, 420 P.3d. at 230.
98. Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.11(4)) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at ¶ 38, 420 P.3d. at 231-32 (“The Parties shall not disclose the existence of this
Letter Agreement and its contents to any third party, except . . . to each Party’s . . . investors
(including Buyer’s venture partners in this transaction) . . . directly and solely for the
purpose of evaluating the proposed transaction.”).
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partners who may elect to join in the acquisition of the Properties under the
terms of this Letter Agreement.”100 Moreover, the Letter Agreement stated
that “Lario shall have the right to assign a portion but not all of its interest
in this Letter Agreement to such investors or partners.” 101 Because Tracker
was an unidentified, and not an undisclosed, principal, the court rejected
RMEI’s civil conspiracy claim and found that RMEI could not avoid the
sale to Lario.102 Likewise, as previously stated above, the agreement
between Tracker and RMEI expressly disclaimed any fiduciary duty
between the parties, and additionally stated that it constituted the entire
agreement between the parties and superseded all prior agreements;
therefore, RMEI’s breach of fiduciary duty claim also failed.103
As for the fraud claims against DGS, RMEI argued that DGS pretended
to represent Lario and that Lario acted alone in its transaction with
RMEI.104 Although certain emails referenced DGS as Lario’s counsel, and
DGS did not correct such misstatements, the court found nothing of
“definite and specific character” to indicate that DGS was not representing
Tracker.105 Thus, at best, the court said DGS’s actions could amount to
fraudulent concealment; however, it also found that DGS did not owe
RMEI a duty to disclose Tracker’s involvement, and such a duty, if
imposed, would essentially eliminate the ability to conduct transactions
with undisclosed principals.106 Moreover, it would interfere with an
attorney’s duties of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her clients.107 Thus,
the court found that DGS did not commit fraud.108
E. Update on Martinez Case
In January 2018, the Colorado Supreme Court granted a petition for writ
of certiorari to review the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in
Case No. 2016CA564, Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v.
Martinez.109 As noted in last year’s Colorado article,110 the Court of

100. Id. at ¶ 39, 420 P.3d. at 232.
101. Id.
102. Id. at ¶¶ 42, 46, 420 P.3d. at 232-33.
103. Id. at ¶¶ 63-64, 420 P.3d. at 235.
104. Id. at ¶ 52, 420 P.3d. at 233.
105. Id. at ¶ 55, 420 P.3d. at 234.
106. Id. at ¶¶ 56-57, 420 P.3d. at 234.
107. Id. at ¶ 57, 420 P.3d. at 234.
108. See id.
109. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, No. 17SC297, 2018 WL
582105, *1 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2018).
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Appeals’ decision in Martinez focused on the intended meaning of the
following statutory provision:
(1)(a) It is declared to be in the public interest to: . . . (I) Foster
the responsible, balanced development, production, and
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of
Colorado in a manner consistent with protection of public health,
safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and
wildlife resources; . . .111
The Petitioners’ argued that public health, safety, and welfare, including
protection of the environment and wildlife resources, were considerations
that must be taken into account when authorizing oil and gas development,
but were not interests that such development should be balanced with or
against.112 The court of appeals ultimately agreed with the Petitioners.
On May 18, 2017, two separate Petitions for Writ of Certiorari were filed
with the Colorado Supreme Court, one by the attorneys for the American
Petroleum Institute and Colorado Petroleum Association (Intervenors) and
one for the COGCC (Petitioner), seeking review of the court of appeals
decision in Martinez. The Colorado Supreme Court granted these petitions,
phrasing the precise issue for consideration as follows: “Whether the court
of appeals erred in determining that the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission
misinterpreted section 34-60-102(1)(a)(l), C. R. S., as requiring a balance
between oil and gas development and public health, safety, and welfare.”113
As of this date, the Colorado Supreme Court has not issued an opinion.
Oral argument is presently scheduled for October 16, 2018.
III. Legislation
During the 2018 legislative session, more than forty bills were
introduced which could have had a material impact on the oil and gas
industry.114 These bills dealt with issues related to oil and gas, the Colorado
Energy Office, renewable energy, and 8-1-1 (Call Before You Dig).115
110. Casey C. Breese, David R. Little, & Diana S. Prulhiere, Colorado, 3 OIL & GAS,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 663, 668 et seq (2017).
111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102, effective July 1, 2007.
112. Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm., 2017 COA 37, ¶ 18, 2017 WL
1089556 at *4 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017).
113. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. Martinez, No. 17SC297, 2018
WL 582105 at *1 (Colorado Jan. 29, 2018).
114. See All Bills, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018),
https://leg.colorado.gov/bill-

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

326

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

A. Select New Legislation
Two bills were passed by the Colorado General Assembly during 2018
that materially affected the oil and gas industry. The most important of
these bills was Senate Bill (“SB”) 18-230.
SB 18-230 amended and updated the statutory spacing and pooling
provisions set out in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116 in five significant
ways.116 First, the bill amended Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116(1) to clarify
that a spacing or pooling order issued by the COGCC may only cover a
portion of an oil and gas pool instead of the entire pool.117 Second, the bill
amended several provisions in the statute, including Colo. Rev. Stat. § 3460-116(3), to confirm that a spacing or pooling order issued by the COGCC
may authorize one or more wells per drilling unit.118 These changes were
intended to update the statute to mirror current COGCC practice.
The third material change amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60116(7)(a)(I) and 34-60-116(7)(a)(II) to require pooling orders issued by the
COGCC to more clearly specify the interests being pooled. These changes
also clarified that the creation of royalty or overriding royalty interests
intended to avoid statutory pooling penalties need not be recognized by the
COGCC. Specifically, royalty interest are to be excluded from the
obligation to pay costs only “if and to the extent that the royalty is
consistent with the lease terms prevailing in the area and is not designed to
avoid the recovery of costs provided for in subsection 7(b) of this
section.”119
Next, a new provision, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116(7)(a)(III) was
added. It provides that pooling orders issued by the COGCC shall
“[s]pecify that a nonconsenting owner is immune from liability for costs
arising from spills, releases, damage, or injury resulting from oil and gas
operations on the drilling unit.”120
search?field_subjects[0]=40&field_subjects[1]=38&field_sessions=45771&field_chamber=
All&field_bill_type=All&sort_bef_combine=search_api_relevance%20DESC. (last visited
July 16, 2018).
115. 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018), https://leg.colorado.gov/billsearch?field_sessions=45771&sort_bef_combine=field_bill_number%20ASC (Search for
Subjects: Energy, Natural Resources & Environment)(last visited July 16, 2018).
116. The COGCC is presently considering a proposed rulemaking to implement these
legislative changes.
117. 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 361 (West).
118. Id.
119. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(a)(I) (as amended in 2018).
120. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(a)(III) (as amended in 2018).
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Finally, SB 18-230 amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(d)(I) to
slow down the statutory pooling process and provide more information for
parties who might be pooled. The amendments clarify that the COGCC
may not issue a pooling order unless at least sixty days have passed
between the date of an offer to each owner to participate in the proposed
well or lease its interest and the date of the hearing. 121 The offers to
participate or lease must also now “include a copy of or link to a brochure
supplied by the commission that clearly and concisely describes the pooling
procedures specified in this section and the mineral owner’s options
pursuant to those procedures.”122
The other material legislation which passed was House Bill (“HB”) 181098. HB 18-1098 amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-122(b) by adding a
new sentence permitting the COGCC to retain funds it collects from oil and
gas companies for purposes of the environmental response fund instead of
having these funds transferred at the end of each fiscal year to the general
fund.123 As amended, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-122(b) now states that
“[t]he year-end balance of the account remains in the account.”124 This
change will provide greater funding for the COGCC to remediate
abandoned oil and gas locations.
B. Indefinitely Postponed Bills
A number of additional bills affecting the oil and gas industry were
introduced and debated but failed to pass scrutiny in the House or the
Senate during the 2018 legislative session. Below are quick summaries of
eleven of these bills.
1. HB 18-1071: Intended to codify Martinez, this bill would have
more expressly and definitively required the regulation of oil and
gas operations in a manner consistent with public health, safety,
and welfare without also considering the need for the
development of oil and gas resources.125

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 361 (West).
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 34-60-116(7)(d)(I) (as amended in 2018).
2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 107 (West).
Id.
H.B. 18-1071, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
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2. HB 18-1150: Would have rendered a local government liable for
damages to operators, mineral lessees, and royalty owners for
bans on hydraulic fracturing.126
3. HB 18-1157: Would have increased reporting of oil and gas
incidents.127
4. HB 18-1289: Would have exempted local government and
school district lands from statutory pooling.128
5. HB 18-1301: Would have required most reclamation plans to
demonstrate (by substantial evidence) an end date for any water
quality treatment necessary to ensure compliance with applicable
water quality standards, eliminate the existing self-bonding
option, and require that all reclamation bonds include financial
assurances of a certain amount.129
6. HB 18-1382: Would have created an Energy Legislative Review
Committee to study energy development, grid security, energy
supply and transmission planning, and other issues that affect
energy policy in Colorado, beginning in 2019.130
7. HB 18-1352: Would have required oil and gas facilities and
wells to be located at least 1,000 feet from school buildings and
other high occupancy buildings, as applied to the school property
line; would not apply if a school commences operations near
such facilities or wells that are already actively in use.131
8. HB 18-1419: Would have mandated that the COGCC
promulgate rules “as soon as practicable” to ensure proper
wellhead integrity of oil and gas production wells. The Bill
would have also required an oil and gas operator to give
electronic notice of each flow line and gathering pipeline
installed, owned, or operated by the operator to each local
government within whose jurisdiction the subsurface facility is
located.132
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

H.B. 18-1150, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1157, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1289, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1301, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1382, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1352, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
H.B. 18-1419, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
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9. SB 18-063: Would have required operators to post greater
financial assurance.133
10. SB 18-064: Would have updated the renewable energy standard
to require that all electric utilities, including cooperative electric
associations and municipally owned utilities, to derive their
energy from 100% renewable energy by 2035.134
11. SB 18-192: Would have made local governments that ban
hydraulic fracturing of an oil and gas well liable to the mineral
interest owners for the value of the mineral interest; would have
further required local governments that enact a moratorium on
oil and gas activities to compensate oil and gas operators,
mineral lessees, and royalty owners for all costs, damages, and
losses of fair market value associated with that moratorium.135
IV. State Regulation
During the period of this update, the COGCC completed one major
rulemaking affecting flowlines. The COGCC approved comprehensive
new flowline regulations incorporated into COGCC Rules in a unanimous
nine-member vote on February 13, 2018.136 The goal of this rulemaking
was essentially to create a new set of cradle to grave rules specifically for
flowlines.137 The regulations address oversight of flowlines and related
infrastructure associated with oil and gas development.138 They strengthen
requirements and establish new standards for the design, installation,
maintenance, testing, tracking, and abandoning of flowlines.139
V. Ballot Initiatives
Dozens of ballot initiatives aimed at amending the Colorado Constitution
or Colorado statutes were proposed during the period of this update and
began the long administrative process of seeking to be placed on the 2018
133. S.B. 18-063, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
134. S.B. 18-064, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
135. S.B. 18-192, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018).
136. COGCC Approves Comprehensive New Flowline Regulations (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/news/cogcc-approves-comprehensive-new-flowlineregulations.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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statewide general election ballot.140 Of these proposals, two initiatives that
materially impact the oil and gas industry have survived the gauntlet and
will appear on the 2018 statewide general election ballot.
The first is Proposition 97, entitled “Setback Requirement for Oil and
Gas Development.” Proposition 97 would enact a new statute, Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 34-60-131, as a part of the Act.141 Section 34-60-131(3) of this
proposed legislation would “establish that all new oil and gas development
not on federal land must be located at least two thousand five hundred feet
from an occupied structure or vulnerable area,” the italicized terms all
being defined under the proposed initiative.142 A recent study by the
COGCC determined that, if passed, this initiative would make the majority
of lands in Colorado unavailable for oil and gas development, including a
very high percentage of those lands near cities or suburban
developments.143
The other initiative is Proposition 108, entitled “Just Compensation for
Reduction in Fair Market Value by Government Law or Regulation.”144 It
proposes to amend Section 15 of Article H of the Colorado Constitution by
adding the following capitalized text to the existing constitutional
provision: “Private property shall not be taken, or damaged, OR
REDUCED IN FAIR MARKET VALUE BY GOVERNMENT LAW OR
REGULATION for public or private use, without just compensation.”145
One purpose of this initiative would be to require state or local governments
to compensate mineral owners and other mineral interest owners for
damages accruing from drilling bans or other government regulation.
Colorado’s 2018 general election is scheduled for November 6, 2018.

140. These initiatives are listed, summarized and documented on the Colorado Secretary
of State website, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/index.html
(last visited on September 3, 2018).
141. The final text of Proposition 97 is available on the Colorado Secretary of State
website, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/index.html (last
visited on September 11, 2018).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. This COGCC study may be found at https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/library/
Technical/Miscellaneous/COGCC_2018_Init_97_GIS_Assessment_20180702.pdf.
144. The final text of Proposition 108 is available on the Colorado Secretary of State
website, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/index.html (last
visited on September 11, 2018).
145. Id.
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